

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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31 OCT 1949

Mr. Howland H. Sargeant  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

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My dear Mr. Sargeant:

This is in reply to your letter of 5 October concerning our study of the jamming of the Voice of America broadcasts. We regret that we have been unable to provide more than general information concerning this activity of the USSR.

Study of the technical aspects of the problem indicates that broadcasts from transmitters in North America are probably at a hopeless disadvantage with respect to the jamming by reason of the long transmission distances involved. This is inherent in the fact that radio signals decrease in intensity as the distance from the transmitter increases and that with any reasonable transmitter powers the signals at the end of a several thousand mile transmission path are relatively weak. Jamming of signals from transmitters located much closer to the service areas in the USSR and the satellite countries is a little more difficult, but so long as amplitude modulation is required and the Soviets control the receivers and the territory in which they are located no spectacular improvement can be effected in our ability to overcome the jamming by any action which we can take at the transmitters.

Although the answers to many of the detailed questions concerning the location of Russian jamming transmitters, their characteristics and detailed methods of operation would appear to be of interest, such information would not enable us to successfully combat a well organized jamming program.

Collection efforts initiated in June immediately after the jamming became intense have yielded little useful information concerning these transmitters. However, other efforts to analyze the system and the organization behind the jamming may prove more productive of information of value to the State Department and to the Department of Defense.

Central Intelligence Agency will keep you advised of all significant progress toward an understanding of the Russian jamming activities and will forward all unevaluated items of information which may have a bearing on the problem.

Sincerely,

sgd &amp; disp via ER 10/31/49

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R. H. HILLENKOTTER  
REAR ADMIRAL, USN  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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